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       Abstract 
Firm cash holdings increased substantially from 1980 to 2013. The overall distribution of firm cash 
holdings changed in the same period. We study the implications of these changes for monetary 
policy. We use Compustat data and a model with financial frictions that allows the calculation of 
the monetary policy effects according to the distribution of cash holdings. We find that the interest 
rate channel of the transmission of monetary policy has become more powerful, as the impact of 
monetary policy over real interest rates increased. With the observed changes in firm cash 
holdings, the real interest rate takes 3.4 months more to return to its initial value after a shock to 
the nominal interest rate. 
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1. Introduction
We obtain predictions for the e¤ect on monetary policy of the changes in the
distribution of corporate cash holdings. Bates et al. (2009), Bover and Watson
(2005) and other studies have noticed the increase in corporate cash holdings since
1980, both in real terms and as a percentage of total cash. Corporate cash holdings
corrected for ination increased ve times from 1980 to 2010. The median cash-sales
ratio increased from 3% in 1980 to 12% in 2010. The mean cash-sales ratio increased
from 6% to 23% during the same period. Corporate cash holdings, measured as cash
and equivalents of the U.S. nonnancial rms listed in Compustat, amounted to 1:56
trillion dollars in 2010. As M1 amounted to 1:84 trillion, according with the FED of
St. Louis data, 1:56 trillion dollars corresponds to 85% of M1. The ratio of corporate
cash holdings decreased from 2010 to 2013, as M1 has increased sharply more recently.
Even so, corporate cash holdings to M1 was equal to 65% in 2013. Moreover, this
ratio was 23% on average from 1980 to 1999 and 75% from 2000 to 2010. The demand
for money from corporations is substantial. Changes in corporate cash holdings can
a¤ect monetary aggregates and monetary policy signicantly.1
Our objective is to analyze the implications of the secular increase in corporate cash
holdings on the e¤ects of monetary policy. We nd that the real interest rate takes
3:4 more months in 2013 than in 1980 to revert to its initial value after a nominal
interest rate shock. These ndings are obtained in a model that simulates the e¤ects
on the real interest rate of a nominal interest rate shock. The main characteristic of
the model is that it takes into account the observed distribution of money holdings.
1We restrict our sample to rms with positive cash, positive assets, assets greater than cash, and
sales greater than 10 million (CPI adjusted with base 1982-1984). We also truncated the rms at
the 1 and 99 percentiles of the cash-sales ratio. With the less stringent constraint of sales greater
than zero, the increase in the median cash-sales ratio is from 3:5% to 13:4%, an increase of 3:8 times.
There are di¤erent measures of cash holdings such as the cash-assets and the cash-net assets ratio.
We use the cash-sales ratio because it has a better data counterpart to the variables in the model.
We explain this variable in more detail in section 1.
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According to the model, the real interest rate takes 1:84 months to revert to its
initial value with the distribution of money holdings of 1980, while with the 2013
distribution of money holdings, the real interest rate takes 5:25 months to revert to
its initial value. Figure (1) shows how long the real interest rate takes to return to
its initial value from 1980 to 2013 according to our simulations.
There is a large literature on the determinants of rm cash holdings. Among the
explanations for rm cash holdings, a partial list includes the transactions role of
cash (Baumol 1952, Tobin 1956, Miller and Orr 1966, Frenkel and Jovanovic 1980),
nancial constraints (Almeida et al. 2004, Acharya et al. 2007), tax purposes (Foley
et al. 2007), agency problems (Kalcheva and Lins 2007), and corporate governance
(Jensen 1986, Blanchard et al. 1994, Dittmar et al. 2003, Pinkowitz et al. 2006,
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2007, Harford et al. 2008, Yun 2009). Empirically, the
di¤erent determinants of rm cash holdings are analyzed by Kim et al. (1998), Opler
et al. (1999), and Ozkan and Ozkan (2004).
The increase in cash holdings is surprising, as the evolution of the technology of
nancial transactions allows rms to sell illiquid assets for cash frequently and to
maintain their operations with little cash. It is also surprising to nd that rms
hold more than half of M1. It would be expected that households would have more
di¢ culty than rms to manage cash, as households face higher transactions costs
and have more di¢ culty in using credit. We do not aim to explain cash holdings
or their secular trend (Bates et al. 2009 identify four causes for the increase: an
increase in R&D expenditures, a fall in inventories, a fall in capital expenditures, and
an increase in cash ow risk). We study the implications of the increase in corporate
cash holdings on the e¤ects of monetary policy. As rms hold a large portion of
the monetary aggregates, it is important to study the e¤ects of the increase in cash
holdings on macroeconomic variables. To the best of our knowledge, we are the rst
to study the consequences of the changes in the distribution of corporate cash for
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monetary policy.2
A related paper is Cole and Ohanian (2002), which studies how shifts in the demand
for money a¤ect the macroeconomic impact of monetary shocks. We emphasize here
the changes in the distribution of cash holdings across rms. Cole and Ohanian (2002)
nd that changes in the relative demands for money between households and rms
have quantitatively important macroeconomic e¤ects in a liquidity model.3
We analyze how changes in rm cash holdings a¤ect macroeconomic variables.
Fresard (2010) and Palazzo (2012) study the real e¤ects of cash holdings on market
share and on equity returns. Here, we study the real e¤ects of the change in the
distribution of cash holdings across rms in the aggregate economy. We take the
distribution of cash holdings as given and study the e¤ects on the real interest rate.
As we are interested in the e¤ects of the distribution of money holdings, we use
a model in which the distribution of money holdings plays an active role. In the
rst cash-in-advance models such as Lucas and Stokey (1987), Cooley and Hansen
(1989), and Hodrick et al. (1991), the distribution of money holdings is degenerate.
All participants in the economy behave as a representative agent and they have the
same demand for money. We cannot evaluate the impact of the distribution of money
with these models because they do not allow any role for the distribution of money.
More recently, the real e¤ects of monetary policy have been studied in new Key-
nesian models (for example, Clarida et al. 1999, Woodford 2003, and Christiano
et al. 2005). These models contain frictions usually in the form of price rigidities.
There is a distribution of prices across rms, but the distribution of money is again
2A recent paper that studies the interaction of rm cash holdings and macroeconomic variables
is Bacchetta, Benhima, and Poilly (2014).
3Cole and Ohanian do not conrm major changes in the e¤ects of money shocks over the postwar
period, as indicated with VARs. However, as Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2008) point out, the
procedure of comparing impulse responses from structural VARs to the theoretical impulse responses
from models and rejecting the model if they are di¤erent can be misleading. In particular, this
procedure cannot be used to reject the liquidity model, as liquidity models do not satisfy the set of
identifying assumptions in VARs.
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degenerate. A representative agent uses all money carried from the last period to buy
products in the current period. As in the cash-in-advance models, the distribution of
money holdings in these models does not a¤ect the results of monetary policy. Other
kinds of frictions, such as informational frictions (Mankiw and Reis 2002) and menu
costs (Golosov and Lucas 2007), have also been introduced to study the real e¤ects of
monetary policy. Alternatively, Stein (1998), Kashyap and Stein (2000), and Bolton
and Freixas (2006) focused on the role of bank lending.
Here, to take into account the e¤ects of changes in the distribution of cash holdings,
we use a market segmentation model. The friction in this kind of model is the sepa-
ration of markets for liquid and illiquid assets. Liquid assets are used for transactions
while illiquid assets receive higher interest yields and are kept mainly as a reserve of
value. These markets are separated in the sense that rms cannot exchange illiquid
assets for cash with a high frequency.
In the data, there is a nondegenerate cross-sectional distribution of cash. Certainly,
the di¤erent rm characteristics, such as corporate governance and idiosyncratic risk,
are reected in their behavior toward cash management. We modify the models in
Alvarez et al. (2009) and Silva (2012) to match the observed distribution of rm cash
holdings in the data. Alvarez et al. (2009) show that the model closely matches the
short-run uctuations in velocity. Here, we use the model to obtain a prediction about
the e¤ects of the increase in cash holdings. The prediction is obtained by calculating
the response of the real interest rate to a nominal interest rate shock for each year
from 1980 to 2013. Our model delivers closed-form solutions for each nominal interest
shock. The shocks follow the interest rate dynamics in Christiano et al. (1999) and
Uhlig (2005). For each year, we recalibrate the model to t the distribution of cash
holdings. As the distribution of cash holdings changes, the response of the real interest
rate changes.
The real e¤ects occur because rmsbehavior with respect to the use of cash de-
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pends on their cash holdings at the time of the shock. Firms with little cash adapt
faster to the shock while rms with large cash holdings take longer to adapt. If the
market segmentation friction is removed, the real interest rate does not move after
the shock and the real e¤ects vanish. As we want to isolate the e¤ects of the change
in cash holdings, we eliminate other mechanisms besides market segmentation that
could generate additional real e¤ects. In particular, there are no sticky prices, output
is constant, and the only change in the economy during the period is in the distrib-
ution of cash holdings. That is, the changes in rm characteristics during the period
are reected in the distribution of cash holdings.
Heterogeneity across cash holdings changes the speed and the size of the adjustment
to the shock. If all rms held the same amount of cash, the mean level, for instance,
then monetary shocks would have di¤erent real e¤ects. This property is not unique
to our model, the new Keynesian Phillips curve model shares this property. Carvalho
and Nechio (2011) show that heterogeneity in the price setting behavior of rms
implies aggregate dynamics substantially di¤erent from the case when all rms have
the same price setting behavior. Here, after the shock hits the economy, the initial
phase of the adjustment process is driven mainly by the set of rms with less cash.
The later part of the adjustment process is dominated by the set of rms with larger
stocks of cash.
We nd that the e¤ects of monetary policy over the real interest rate are now
more persistent than in 1980, as there has been a substantial increase in the cash
holdings by rms since then. The e¤ects of monetary policy are now stronger, as
monetary authorities have more ability to a¤ect real variables. Consistent with this
idea, Clarida et al. (2000) state that monetary policy has been more e¤ective after
1980.
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Fig. 1: Simulations with the model of section 3 for a given nominal interest rate
shock. The simulations take into account the distribution of the cash-sales ratio for
each year.
2. The Distribution of Cash Holdings over Time
Figure (2) shows the median and the mean of the cash-sales ratio from 1980 to 2013.
Di¤erent measures of cash have been used to analyze rm cash holdings such as the
cash-net assets ratio (used, for example, by Opler et al. 1999) and the cash-assets
ratio (by Bates et al. 2009). The cash-sales ratio has been used, among others, by
Mulligan (1997), Harford (1999), Harford et al. (2008), and Bover andWatson (2005).
Both, the cash-assets ratio and the cash-sales ratio, have been increasing substantially
over time. The cash-assets ratio indicates the way in which a rm allocates cash in
its portfolio of assets. The cash-sales ratio indicates how much cash a rm holds with
respect to the ow of resources obtained with its operations. It has a more direct
interpretation in terms of the use of cash for transactions. The conclusions of this
paper are robust to the use of one measure or the other. We use the cash-sales ratio
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because its interpretation cash relative to the ow of resources obtained allows a
better connection between the model parameters and the data.4
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Fig. 2: Mean and median of the cash-sales ratio across rms for each year. The
cash-sales ratio state how much rms maintain of their sales in cash. A cash-sales
ratio of 0.1, for example, means that rms maintain 10 percent of their yearly sales,
or 1.2 months of sales, in cash. Source: Compustat; see note 4 for details.
As cash is measured in dollars and sales is measured in dollars per unit of time,
the cash-sales ratio is a variable given in units of time. The median cash-sales ratio
of 0:12 year in 2010, for example, means that rms maintained about 1:4 months of
their sales in the form of cash. In 1980, this same ratio was only 0:03, or 11 days. The
mean cash-sales ratio in the same period increased from 0:06 in 1980 to 0:23 in 2010.
4Our measure of cash is cash and equivalents from Compustat, cash and short-term investments,
CHE, U.S. nonnancial rms. CHE is not available for utilities, so the dataset removes this sector.
To avoid anomalies, we remove observations with cash or assets equal to zero, and observations
with cash greater than assets. To avoid extreme cash-sales ratios, we remove observations with sales
smaller than 10 million and observations with cash/sales below the 1st and above the 99th percentiles
of cash/sales. We later report results without this truncation, which barely changes results. We
correct for ination with the CPI from the FED St. Louis, CPIAUCSL, base 1982-84. For sales, we
use SALE in Compustat. Our procedure implies 140,435 rm-years or about 4,130 rms per year.
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The distribution of the cash-sales ratio across rms is highly asymmetric as it can be
inferred by the di¤erence between its mean and median. The mean was more than
two times the median during the whole period and it reached 5:8 times the median
in 2000.
If there was no benet of maintaining cash, rms would choose a cash-sales ratio
approximately equal to zero, as holding cash implies an opportunity cost in interest
foregone. As the cash-sales ratio is sizeable in economic terms, the data indicate the
existence of costs in the management of money. These costs may be in the form
of transaction costs or in the form of management costs. A portfolio manager, for
example, may schedule sales of long term bonds to coincide with cash needs, but this
and other more elaborate schedules of payments are costly. It does not matter the
nature of the costs of managing cash holdings for our purposes. What is important
is that rm cash holdings are positive and considerable. We take the values of rm
cash holdings as given.
Usually, rms maintain cash-sales ratios smaller than one. The 95th percentile of
the distribution of the cash-sales ratio reached a maximum of 1:3 in 2000 and it was
about 1 during 2002-2007. A cash-sales ratio above one means that a rm keeps more
than one year of sales in the form of cash. Firms that maintain high cash-sales ratios
tend to be smaller rms in terms of sales; the same is true for the cash-assets ratio.
Figure (3) shows the median of the cash-sales ratio over the same period for rms
grouped in percentiles of sales. We see that the cash ratio increased for all groups.
Moreover, while the cash ratio increased 3 times for all rms as a whole, it increased 5
times for rms in the smaller percentiles. Bates et al. (2009) show a similar evolution
for the cash-assets ratio.
In addition to the increase in the cash-sales ratio, rm cash holdings correspond to a
large fraction of the monetary aggregates and this fraction has increased substantially.
From 1980 to 2010, the ratio between rm cash holdings to M1 increased from 30
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Fig. 3: Median of the cash-sales ratio for di¤erent percentiles of sales. Source:
Compustat; see note note 4 for details.
percent to 85 percent. This fraction decreased to 65 percent in 2013, still more than
two times the ratio in 1980. As we show in this paper, a consequence of the increase
in the proportion of rm cash holdings over monetary aggregates is that monetary
policy has a much stronger e¤ect than it had in the past.5
Figure (4) shows the distribution of the cash-sales ratio for each year. The dis-
tributions look symmetric because the gure shows the logs of the cash-sales ratio.
The support and the median of the distribution of the cash-sales ratio increased over
time. The support of the distribution increased rst and the median increased later.
In 1980, the maximum cash-sales ratio was equal to 7 months, i.e., below one year.
5M1 is dened as currency plus traveler checks plus checkable deposits. In January 2014, currency
corresponds to 43.6% of M1 and checkable deposits to 56.3%. The denition of cash and equivalents
in Compustat includes the components of M1 and securities readily transferable to cash,which
includes short term commercial paper, short term government securities, and money market funds.
In our sample, the cash portion of cash and equivalents correspond on average to 70% of cash and
equivalents.
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Fig. 4: Distribution of the cash-sale ratio across rms from 1980 to 2013 for selected
years. Each curve has the distribution for one year (density histograms with 20
groups). The curves are approximately symmetric because it shows the logs of the
cash-sales ratio; the actual distribution is highly asymmetric. Over the years, the
support and the median of the cash-sales ratio increased. Source: Compustat; see
note 4 for details.
The maximum cash ratio was above 1 after 1983. In 2000, the maximum cash ra-
tio was 5 years (the 95th percentile was 1:3). Figure (2) shows that the increase in
the median of the cash ratio accelerated after 2000 and gure (4) shows that the
distribution of cash holdings changed substantially after this date. The two gures
complement each other as they show that rm cash holdings changed especially after
2000.
As gure (6) shows, the distribution of cash holdings across rms is not uniform;
it is far from degenerate; and it has changed over time. Our objective is to calculate
the predictions of the e¤ects of monetary policy shocks under di¤erent distributions
of cash holdings. In order to do so, we need a model that takes into account the
di¤erent distributions of cash holdings. We introduce this model in the next section.
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3. The Model
The model combines the cash inventory framework analyzed by Baumol (1952) and
Tobin (1956), as agents use cash holdings gradually during holding periods, with the
market segmentation framework introduced by Grossman and Weiss (1983), Rotem-
berg (1984), and later studied, among others, by Grossman (1987), Alvarez et al.
(2009), and Silva (2012). The economy is composed by rms with di¤erent bond
and cash holdings. There is market segmentation between the goods market and the
assets market. Firms trade bonds for money in the asset market and goods for money
in the goods market. Market segmentation implies that rms sell bonds for money
and transfer the proceeds periodically from the asset market to the goods market. As
a result, there will be a nondegenerate distribution of cash and bond holdings in the
economy.
The model is closely related to Silva (2012). In Silva (2012), there is an explicit cost
of transferring money from the assets market to the goods market and the holding
period is obtained endogenously. Here, we abstract from this cost and set the holding
period exogenously as we focus on the short-run dynamics of interest rates. It is
assumed implicitly that the short-run dynamics will not a¤ect the holding periods in
an important way.6 On the other hand, di¤erent holding period lengths are allowed
for the distinct groups of rms in the economy. In this way, we match the distribution
of rmscash holdings observed in the data.
The groups of rms are indexed by i = 1; :::; I. The fraction of rms in each group
is given by vi, where
PI
i=1 vi = 1. Each rm has a bank account and a brokerage
account. The bank account is used to hold cash for transactions in the goods market.
The brokerage account is used to trade bonds in the asset market. An important
6Alvarez et al. (2009) also keep holding periods xed in the short run. Adao and Silva (2014)
endogenize the decision of the size of the holding period, N , common to all agents in the model.
Our modications imply closed-form solutions for the e¤ects of shocks.
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assumption is that the return of assets in the brokerage account is higher than the
return of cash in the bank account. It is assumed to simplify that the return on
cash is zero and the return on assets in the brokerage account is positive. Time is
continuous, t  0. Let M0i denote cash holdings at t = 0 of rms in the group i and
let B0i denote bond holdings at t = 0 of rms in the group i. Each rm has an initial
portfolio given by si = (M0i; B0i).
The time interval between transfers of money from the asset market to the goods
market, the holding period, is the same for all rms that belong to the same group
and is denoted by Ni. Di¤erent holding periods express di¤erent forms of portfolio
management by the rms in the economy, which we do not address in the paper.
We do not provide an explanation of why rms have di¤erent holding period sizes,
instead we take the distribution of cash holding period sizes fNigIi=1 that reproduces
the distribution of cash holdings over time, which is given by gure (6).
The rms in group i are distributed uniformly over the interval [0; Ni). Alvarez
et al. (2009) and Grossman (1987) also dispose agents uniformly over the holding
period, but they only consider one holding period size. In contrast, we allow for
various holding period with sizes fNigIi=1.
Firms in the group i produce Yi goods at time t and obtain P (t)Yi of sales at
time t, where P (t) denotes the price level at time t. The proceeds of sales are
deposited directly to the brokerage account and converted into bonds. The price
of bonds at time t is given by Q (t), with Q (0) = 1. The nominal interest rate is
r (t)   d logQ (t) =dt. The portfolio choice across di¤erent bonds in the brokerage
account is not important for our results. For this reason, we simplify the model by
having one positive and deterministic rate of return r (t). The rate of return on assets
in the brokerage account is the opportunity cost of money, and the rms will manage
cash over the holding period according with the path of r (t).
Let Tji (si), j = 1; 2; :::, denote the times of the transfers of rm si, and dene
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T0i (si)  0 as that will simplify the notation later. Firms start with initial values of
cash and bond holdings given by the pair (M0i; B0i). At Tji (si), rm si sells bonds for
money and transfers the proceeds to the goods market. The holding period of rm si
is [Tj;i (si) ; Tj+1;i (si)). We have Tj+1;i   Tj;i = Ni for j = 1; 2; ::: for all si rms, i =
1; :::; I. Cash holdings are denoted by M (t; si). Cash just after a transfer is denoted
by M+ (Tji (si) ; si) and is equal to limt!Tji;t>TjiM (t; si). Analogously, cash just
before a transfer is denoted by M  (Tji (si) ; si) and is equal to limt!Tji;t<TjiM (t; si).
The transfer amount from the brokerage account to the bank account is given by
M+   M . Similarly, bonds just before a transfer and just after a transfer are
given by B  (Tji (si) ; si) and B+ (Tji (si) ; si) ; respectively. If the amount of cash
transferred to the bank account is positive, then B  > B+. Cash holdings in the
brokerage account are zero, as cash does not receive interest and it is not possible to
purchase goods with cash in the brokerage account. The optimal policy is to keep
most of the resources in bonds in the brokerage account and make periodical transfers
to the bank account.
The rm manager of rm si starts with assets (M0i; B0i) ; receives a ow of funds
P (t)Yi in the brokerage account, and aims to achieve an optimal amount of trans-
actions ci (t; si). The measurement unit for transactions is chosen so that its price is
P (t) : We assume the manager prefers a smooth ow of transactions ci (t; si) to an
uneven one with the same average. Because it simplies the analysis we take that
the objective function the manager seeks to maximize is logarithmic in the amount of
transactions. The logarithmic utility allows us to obtain analytical solutions for the
dynamics of the real interest rate after shocks.
The problem of the rm manager is to choose transactions ci (t; si), cash Mi (t; si),
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and bonds Bi (t; si) such that
max
c;B;M
1X
j=0
Z Tj+1;i(si)
Tji(si)
e t log (ci (t; si)) dt (1)
subject to
M+i (Tji (si)) +B
+
i (Tji (si)) = M
 
i (Tji (si)) +B
 
i (Tji (si)) , j = 1; 2; ::: (2)
_Bi (t; si) = r (t)Bi (t; si) + P (t)Yi, t  0, t 6= T1i (si) ; T2i (si) ; :::; (3)
_Mi (t; si) =  P (t) ci (t; si) , t  0, t 6= T1i (si) ; T2i (si) ; :::; (4)
Mi (t; si)  0, ci (t; si)  0, given M0i (si)  0, and where  > 0 is the rate of
intertemporal discounting. At t = T1i (si) ; T2i (si) ; :::, constraint (3) is replaced by
_Bi (Tji (si) ; si)
+ = r (t)B+i (Tji (si) ; si) + P (t)Yi, where _Bi (Tji (si) ; si)
+ is the right
derivative of Bi (t; si) with respect to time at t = Tji (si). Similarly, constraint (4)
is replaced by _Mi (Tji (si) ; si)
+ =  P (t) c+i (Tji (si) ; si), where _Mi (t; si)+ is the cor-
responding right derivative for cash and c+i (Tji (si) ; si) is transactions just after the
transfer.
With (3), we can write B i (Tji) as a function of the interest payments accrued dur-
ing [Tj 1; Tj). Substituting recursively and using the no-Ponzi condition limj!+1Q (Tj)
B+i (Tji) = 0, we obtain the present value constraint
1X
j=1
Q (Tji (si))M
+
i (Tji (si) ; si) 
1X
j=1
Q (Tji (si))M
 
i (Tj (si) ; si) +W0i (si) ; (5)
where W0i (si)  B0i (si) +
R1
0
Q (t)P (t)Yidt. Constraint (5) states that the present
value of cash transfers is equal to the present value of deposits in the brokerage
account.
To minimize the cost of holding money, rms adjust cash M+i (Tj) and the use of
15
cash during holding periods so that M i (Tj+1;i) = 0. That is, cash transfers should
be just enough for the transactions during the holding period. Only M i (T1i) might
be positive because M0i is given. Since M i (Tji) = 0, for j  2, then from (4), cash
at time t is given by Mi (t; si) =
R Tj+1;i(si)
t
P () ci ( ; si) d , Tji (si)  t < Tj+1;i (si),
j = 1; 2; ::: Cash at the beginning of a holding period is given by
M+i (Tji (si) ; si) =
Z Tj+1;i(si)
Tj;i(si)
P () ci ( ; si) d , j = 1; 2; :::. (6)
Below, instead of solving the problem of maximizing (1) subject to (2)-(4), we consider
the simpler problem of maximizing (1) subject to (4) and (5). The transactions,
ci (t; si) ; and cash, Mi (t; si) ; that solve this simpler problem can be used in (2) and
(3) to obtain the bonds, Bi (t; si) :
The government executes monetary policy through open market operations, that
is, by exchanging bonds for money with the rm managers in the assets market.
The government supplies aggregate cash M (t). An increase in the supply of cash
generates revenue, or seigniorage, given by _M (t) =P (t). We abstract from government
consumption or taxes to concentrate on the e¤ects of monetary policy. As a result,
the government budget constraint is given by BG0 =
R1
0
Q (t) _M (t) dt, where BG0 is
the aggregate supply of government bonds.
The market clearing condition for cash is given by
P
i vi
R
Mi (t; si) dF (si) = M (t),
where F is the distribution of si. As stated above, F (si) is an uniform distribution
over [0; Ni), for i = 1; :::; I. Similarly, the market clearing conditions for bonds and
goods are given by BG0 =
P
i vi
R
B0i (si) dF (si) and
P
i vi
R
ci (t; si) dF (si) = Y ,
respectively.
The equilibrium is dened as a vector of prices fP (t) ; Q (t)g, and allocations
fMi (t; si) ; Bi (t; si) ; ci (t; si)gIi=1 such that fMi (t; si) ; Bi (t; si) ; ci (t; si)gIi=1 solves the
maximization problems (1)-(4) given fP (t) ; Q (t)g for all si in the support of F (si);
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the government budget constraint holds; and the market clearing conditions for cash,
bonds, and goods hold.
4. The Distribution of Cash Holdings
The opportunity cost of holding cash implies that it is optimal to start a holding
period with more cash than in the rest of the holding period and spend this cash
gradually until the next transfer, which initiates a new holding period. The rms en-
gage in (S; s) policies on spending, bonds, and cash. Aggregate variables are obtained
by the aggregation of the (S; s) policies across rms. The aggregate cash holdings at
time t, for example, is obtained by the aggregation of the cash holdings of each rm
at t.
We rst characterize an economy in the steady state; an equilibrium in which the
ination rate is constant and the interest rate is constant. We then study shocks to
an economy initially in the steady state. With constant ination and interest rate,
the (S; s) policies of the rms in each group have the same pattern. Transactions, for
example, have the same pattern across rms in the same group.
The relevant variable for a rm is its position in the holding period. Let ni 2 [0; Ni)
denote the position of a rm of the group i in the holding period. Firm ni makes
transfers from the brokerage account to the bank account at T1i (ni) = ni, T2i (ni) =
ni +Ni and so on.
Consider the pattern of transactions for each rm. The rst order condition for
ci (t; ni) of the problem of maximizing (1) subject to (4) and (5) implies P (t) ci (t; ni) =
e t=[i (ni)Q(Tj)], for t 2 (Tji (ni), Tj+1;i (ni)), j  1, where i (ni) is the La-
grange multiplier of (5). Let c0i denote transactions at the beginning of a holding
period for rms in group i. Then, transactions during the holding periods of rms
in group i are given by ci (t; ni) = c0ie(r  )te r(t Tji), for the largest j such that
t 2 [Tji (ni) ; Tj+1;i (ni)). Integrating the transactions of all rms in group i, we ob-
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tain the aggregate transactions of group i, Ci (t) = c0ie(r  )t(1   e rNi)=(rNi). In
the steady state, aggregate transactions for rms in the same group are constant.
Therefore, in a steady state equilibrium, the nominal interest rate is equal to the
ination rate plus the real interest rate , i.e. r = + .
Given r =  + , then ci (t; ni) = c0ie r(t Tji). Transactions during holding pe-
riods must be equal to the cash generated by sales during the same holding pe-
riod. Therefore,
R Tji+1
Tji
ci (t; ni) dt =
R Tji+1
Tji
Yidt, where Tji+1   Tj = Ni. Substitut-
ing c0ie r(t Tji) yields the value of transactions at the beginning of holding periods,
c0i(1  e rNi)=(rNi) = Yi. As we will parameterize the model using data on the cash-
sales ratio of rms, it is useful to characterize the variable transactions-sales ratio.
Let c^i  ci=Yi denote the transactions-sales ratio of rms in group i. We have
c^0i (r)
1  e rNi
rNi
= 1, (7)
which determines c^0i, given Ni and the interest rate. The transactions-sales ratios
during t 2 [Tji (ni) ; Tj+1;i (ni)) for rms in group i are given by c^i (t; ni) = c^0ie r(t Tji).
Aggregate cash holdings are equal to M (t) =
P
i vi
1
Ni
R
Mi (t; ni) dni. Denote the
cash-sales ratio by m (t) = M (t) = (P (t)Y ). In the appendix, we show that the
cash-sales ratio in this economy is given by
m =
1
Y
IX
i=1
vi
c0i (r)

e rNi

erNi   1
rNi
  e
(r )Ni   1
(r   )Ni

. (8)
The price level at time zero is equal to P0 = M0= (mY ), where M0 denotes the
money supply at time zero and Y denotes sales. We interpret P0 as the price before
the monetary shock hits the economy.
Cash holdings at time t for rms of group i are given byMi (t; ni) =
R Tj+1;i(ni)
t
P ()
ci ( ; si) d . The cash-sales ratios for rms in group i are given bymi (ni) = M0i (ni)
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(P0Y0i)
 1, ni 2 [0; Ni), where M0i (ni) is the initial cash holdings. The M0i (ni) com-
patible with an equilibrium where r and  are constant is obtained by requiring that
M0i (ni) is just enough to cover transactions from t = 0 until the rst transfer of rm
ni, at T1i = ni. The M0i (ni) are determined in the appendix. Dividing by P0Yi, the
cash-sales ratio of the rms along ni 2 [0; Ni) are given by
mi (ni) =
rNie
 rNinierni
1  e rNi
1  e ni
ni
. (9)
According to (9), cash-sales ratios are distributed along [0;mHi), where mHi =
limni!Nim (ni). As rms are distributed uniformly along [0; Ni), the density fi (x) of
rm cash-sale ratios is given by 1
Ni
@m 1i (x)
@m
, where m 1i (x) is the value of ni such that
mi (ni) = x. There exists a unique value of m 1i (x), as mi (ni) is increasing. There-
fore, fi (x) = 1Ni [rx +
rNi
1 e rNi e
 rNie(r )m
 1
i (x)] 1, mi 2 [0;mHi). For the aggregate
rms in the economy, the density function is f (x) =
P
i vifi (x) dx, where vi is the
fraction of rms distributed along [0; Ni), which ensures that
R
f (x) dx = 1. If we
observe an economy with constant r and  at an arbitrary time, the cross section of
the cash-sales will be given by f (x), x 2 [0;max (mHi)).
In the data, the distribution of real money holdings is concentrated on small quan-
tities of money, but it is close to a uniform. In the parameterization, the values of vi
and mHi are set so that the model distribution of the cash-sales ratio approximates
the actual distribution available in the Compustat data. Figure (5) shows an example
with I = 4.
Figure (6) shows the actual distribution and the parameterized distributions for
the years 1980 and 2010. The gure shows the typical shapes of the actual and
parameterized distributions over the years. The actual distributions in the gure are
the same as the ones shown in gure (4) for 1980 and 2010. For each year, the nominal
interest rate, r, is the commercial paper interest rate and the values of mHi and vi are
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Fig. 5: The parameterization is made by nding the values of mHi and vi, i = 1; :::; I,
so that the model distribution of cash-sales ratios approximates the distribution in
the data. I is set to 50 in the simulations.
found to match the actual distributions of the cash-sales ratios. As explained in the
next section, instead of vi, we use the fraction of sales of rms in group i with respect
to total sales, vYi , to obtain a counterpart with the data on cash-sales.
7 Figure (6)
shows the logs of the cash-sales ratio, as the distribution is highly asymmetric toward
small values of the cash-sales ratio.
Liq08. Calib04.m. Calibration E.
1980 2010
Fig. 6: Actual and parameterized distributions of the cash-sales ratio for 1980 and
for 2010.
7vi =
niP
ni
whereas vYi =
niYi
Y . Both
P
vi =
P
vYi = 1. We have that vYi =
Yi
Y
vi, where
Y = YPni . The advantage of using vYi is to characterize the equilibrium variables by using the
expressions of the consumption-income ratio.
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5. Firm Cash Holdings and Monetary Policy Shocks
A monetary policy is summarized by a nominal interest rate path r (t), t  0. The
central bank sets the interest rate path, such as a target for the federal funds rate, and
then changes the money supply to obtain the pre-determined target. In the model, a
change in r (t) a¤ects rm i cash holdings Mi (t; ni). The central bank supplies M (t)
to satisfy the market clearing condition for cash. The interest rate path determines
bond prices Q (t) = e R(t), where R (t) =
R t
0
r (s) ds.
It is equivalent to set M (t) and obtain the equilibrium r (t) or to set r (t) and
obtain the equilibrium M (t). To obtain equilibrium prices, however, it is simpler
to set r (t) and obtain the other equilibrium variables. The evidence suggests that
the practice of central banks is to set monetary policy in terms of interest rates. By
focusing on r (t) as the target for the monetary policy, we follow the literature, for
example, Woodford (2003).
When an unexpected increase in the interest rate hits the economy, rms have
di¤erent cash holdings M0i (n). Firms with little cash are about to make a transfer.
These rms adapt fast to the shock because they make a transfer soon after the shock.
With the bond trade and subsequent transfer, they adjust cash holdings taking into
account the new interest rate path. Firms with large cash holdings take longer to
make their rst transfer after the shock. Until when they make a transfer, they can
only adjust transactions.8
The di¤erent reactions of transactions a¤ect the real interest rate. If the holding
periods Ni are small, the real interest rate changes little. If Ni ! 0, we are back to
the standard cash-in-advance model with a representative agent and the real interest
rate doesnt move. If the values of Ni are large, there is a large degree of heterogeneity
across agents. Their di¤erent reactions after the shock make the real interest rate
8Christiano, et al. (1996) present evidence that rms in fact take long on average to adjust their
portfolios after an interest rate shock.
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change.
The di¤erent reactions in transactions make the price level move slowly after an
increase in the nominal interest rate. As the real interest rate is equal to the di¤er-
ence between the nominal interest rate and the rate of ination, the real interest rate
increases together with the nominal interest rate just after the shock. Market segmen-
tation, therefore, explains the real e¤ects of monetary policy through the reactions of
agents according to their cash holdings at the time of the shock.9
Let t = 0 be the time of the interest rate shock. The shock occurs when the
economy is initially with constant interest rate r and constant ination . Let z (t)
denote the real interest rate and  (t) denote the rate of ination,  (t)  _P (t) =P (t).
The real interest rate at each time is given by z (t) = r (t)    (t). To obtain z (t),
we have to determine the price level at each time P (t). Before the shock, the real
interest rate is  and r = + .
Cash and bond holdings of rm i at the time of the shock,M0i (ni) and B0i (ni), are
such that the economy would continue in a steady state equilibrium had the shock not
happened. These cash holdings represent the choices before the shock. To solve for
the transition after the shock, we solve problem (1)-(4), usingM0i (ni) and B0i (ni) as
initial conditions. As a result, rms with cash and bond holdings chosen previously
are caught by surprise by a di¤erent interest rate path r (t).
As Grossman (1987), we assume that bonds B0i (ni) are contingent to the shock.
That is, constraint (2) is extended for two states of nature. In one state of nature,
the economy continues in the steady state and in another state of nature the nominal
interest rate follows r (t). The constraint shares the same Lagrange multiplier across
the two states of nature, which can be written as function of the transaction-sales
ratio just after transfers c^0i. We make the probability of the shock small and use the
9A slow response of prices and an increase in the real interest rate after an increase in the nominal
interest rate is found in many empirical studies. Among others, Cochrane (1994), Christiano et al.
(1999), Khan et al. (2002), Bernanke et al. (2005), and Uhlig (2005).
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values of c^0i to solve for the equilibrium after the shock.
The equilibrium price level is obtained through the market clearing condition for
goods. After the shock, there are rms in each group i that have made a transfer
taking into account the shock, and other rms that have not made the rst transfer
yet. Firms that have not made a transfer make transfers out of M0i (ni). Firms that
have made the transfer rst are rms with smaller values of ni 2 [0; Ni), as they make
the rst transfer at T1i = ni. Aggregate transactions for rms in group i are given by
Ci (t) =
1
Ni
Z t
0
e t
iQ (T1 (ni))P (t)
dni +
1
Ni
Z Ni
t
e t
 (ni)P (t)
dni, 0  t < Ni, (10)
where i = 1=(P0c0i) is the Lagrange multiplier associated to (2) and  (ni) is the
Lagrange multiplier associated to the constraint for M  (T1i)  0; the value of  (ni)
depends on M0i and it is stated in the appendix. The second term in the right of
equation (10) determines transactions when t is close to zero; and the rst term dom-
inates transactions when t is close to Ni. The interpretation is that most rms cannot
react completely to the shock just after the shock arrived but can do it gradually. As
a result, prices react slowly to the shock.
The equilibrium price path P (t) is obtained by equating
P
viCi (t) to aggregate
sales. The logarithm utility allows us to isolate P (t). In order to obtain a counterpart
with the data on cash-sales, we rewrite the equation in terms of the fraction of sales
of rms in group i with respect to total sales, vYi . Proposition 1 describes the solution
for prices obtained with equation (10) and completes the characterization of P (t) for
t  Ni. The version of the market segmentation model that we use gives us great
exibility. Apart from the integral in eR(n), which can be solved fast with numerical
methods, we have closed-form solutions for the price level for any r (t).10
10In particular, we dont need to assume an arbitrary initial path for the price level P 0 (t), t 2
[0;+1), and iterate P j (t) until it converges. That would greatly slow down the solution. The
assumption of logarithmic preferences allows us to isolate P (t).
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Proposition 1 Prices after shocks. The equilibrium price level P (t) after a nom-
inal interest rate shock with path r (t), t  0, is given by
P (t) =
PI
i=1 vYie
 tP0c^0i

1
Ni
R t
0
eR(ni)dni +
1 e r(Ni t)
rNi

, for 0  t < N1,
P (t) = vY1
1
N1
P0c^01e
 t R t
t N1 e
R(n1)dn1
+
PI
i=2 vYie
 tP0c^0i

1
Ni
R t
0
eR(ni)dni +
1 e r(Ni t)
rNi

, for N1  t < N2,
...
P (t) =
PI
i=1 vYi
1
Ni
P0c^0ie
 t R t
t Ni e
R(ni)dni, for t  NI ,
(11)
where r is the nominal interest rate before the shock and R (ni) 
R n
0
r (s) ds. The
real interest rate is given by z (t) = r (t)    (t), where  (t) is the ination rate,
 (t) = _P (t) =P (t).
As M0i (ni) are cash holdings under the initial steady state, they can be too large
given the new interest rate path r (t). Firms can choose M  > 0 after the shock. In
the proof of proposition 1, we show thatM  = 0 for any r (t). When there is a shock,
rms adapt to the shock by changing transactions rather than choosing M  (n) > 0.
An implication of this result is that the e¤ects of a decrease or an increase in the
nominal interest rate are symmetric.
Proposition 1 implies that monetary policy a¤ects real interest rates. According to
the Fisher relation z (t) = r (t)   (t), the real interest rate changes after a nominal
interest rate shock only if ination moves slowly after the shock. In a standard
cash-in-advance model,  (t) changes instantaneously after a shock to r (t) and z (t)
remains constant. Here,  (t) remains constant just after the shock because of the
e¤ects of market segmentation. As a result, the real interest rate increases with the
nominal interest rate.
We can determine the e¤ects of market segmentation using (11). Suppose, for
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example, that the shock is a permanent increase of the nominal interest rate from r1
to r2. Before the shock, ination is equal to r1    and the real interest rate is equal
to . We have eR(t) = er2t. Solving for _P (t) =P (t), we obtain that ination just after
the shock is equal to r1 , its value before the shock. The real interest rate increases
to  + r2   r1. After t = max(Ni), we have P (t) = ke(r2 )t, where k is a positive
constant. Only after t we have that ination increases to r2   , where t  t means
that all rms made the rst bond trade after the shock, taking into account the new
shock. If t is large, it takes longer for ination to converge to its value at the new
steady state. Ination reacts slowly to the shock. A nominal shock, however, cannot
a¤ect real variables indenitely. In accordance with this idea, the model implies that
the real interest decreases gradually to its steady state value, . The e¤ects on the
real interest rate last longer if the values of Ni are larger.
We emphasize that P (t) is an equilibrium price. Prices are not assumed to be
sticky. We isolate the e¤ects of the monetary policy on the behavior toward the
management of cash holdings. We focus on the management of cash holdings because
the distribution of cash holdings has greatly changed in the last decades.
Proposition 2 focus the e¤ects of market segmentation. It generalizes the result that
the price level reacts slowly to a shock to the nominal interest rate. The proposition
shows in particular that the real interest rate increases by the same size of the increase
in the nominal interest rate just after the shock. It also shows that the real interest
rate does not move if we eliminate market segmentation.
Proposition 2 Slow reaction of prices. For any interest rate path r (t) announced
at time t = 0, the price level and the ination rate do not move just after the shock,
P (0) = P0,  (0) = r   , and the change in the real interest rate at t = 0 is equal
to the change in the nominal interest rate, v (0)   v = r (0)   r. If Ni ! 0, the real
interest rate is constant and equal to  for any r (t) and all t  0.
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Consider now a monetary policy shock as the one estimated by Uhlig (2005). Ac-
cording to gure 2, plot 6, in Uhlig, reproduced in gure (7), a monetary policy shock,
described as an increase in the federal funds rate, initially increases the interest rate
0:3 percentage points and gradually decreases the interest rate towards its initial
value. On average, the interest rate returns to its initial value in about 2 years and
stays below its initial value for some time until it returns to zero. We approximate this
shock with the process for the interest rate given by r (t) = r1 + (r2   r1 +Bt) e t,
also depicted in gure (7), where r2   r1 = 0:3 percentage points per year. We set
B and  so that r (t) approximates the average impulse response of the federal funds
rate as estimated by Uhlig (2005). We set  = 3 percent per year.11 The estimation
in gure (7), as explained by Uhlig, uses a range of OLS estimates of a VAR. We later
use di¤erent estimates for the monetary policy shock for comparison.12
Given the distributions of the cash-sales ratio from 1980 to 2013, we hit the economy
with the shock r (t) and obtain the real interest rate path using the expressions of
proposition 1. As explained in section 4, the cash-sales distribution for each year
is obtained by determining the values of vYi and Ni so that the distribution of the
cash-sales ratio from the model approximates the actual distribution of the cash-sales
ratio given by Compustat data.13 According to proposition 1, the real interest rate
z (t) implied by the shock to r (t) depends on the distribution of the cash-sales ratio
across rms. The paths for the real interest rates for each year are our predicted
e¤ects of shocks to r (t) given the distributions of the cash-sales ratio.
Figure (8) shows the equilibrium real interest rate obtained from the model for the
11This value for  has been used by Lucas (2000), Silva (2012), among others. It implies that a
nominal interest rate of 3 percent per year in the steady state generates zero ination.
12The expression of r (t) is a result of the di¤erential equation m

r (t) + c

r (t) + kr (t) = 0,  =
c= (2m), which describes a dampened shock. We set r1 = 3% p.a. and r2 = 3:3% p.a. Figure (7)
expresses the results as the di¤erence from the initial value of the nominal interest rate. In our
simulations, t denotes one day and we divide the year in 360 days. B =  0:15% and  = 0:30, for
r (t) given in percentage per year.
13Table 1 in the appendix shows the values of vY i and Ni for 1980 and 2010.
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Fig. 7: Process for the nominal interest rate path, r(t) = r1+(r2 r1+Bt)e t, with
the parameters B and  used in the simulations, B =  0:15% and  = 0:30, for r (t)
given in percentage per year. The parameters B and  were chosen to approximate the
impulse-response function for the monetary policy shock estimated in Uhlig. Figure
reproduced from Uhlig (2005), Fig 2, plot 6), with the process r(t) for the nominal
interest rate path added to the gure.
cash-sales distributions of the selected years from 1980 to 2013 as shown in gure (4).
We show the di¤erence in percentage points from the initial value of the real inter-
est rate. For a standard cash-in-advance model, we would have a straight line after
the shock, z (t) = 0, as a standard cash-in-advance model implies an instantaneous
reaction of prices and no change in real interest rates. Here, with market segmenta-
tion, the real interest rate increases after the nominal interest rate shock and returns
gradually to its initial value.
We measure the e¤ect of monetary policy by the time that it takes for the real
interest rate to reach its initial value. In gure (8), we have, for example, that the
real interest rate reaches its initial value in 1:84 month given the cash distribution
of 1980. Given the cash distribution of 2013, the real interest rate reaches its initial
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Fig. 8: Response of the real interest rate for selected years given the nominal interest
rate shock of gure (7). Results from simulations. The distribution of cash holdings
is determined through the data for each year. The markers in the horizontal axis
show the time for the real interest rate to return to its initial value. The values are
1:84, 2:58, 3:88, 4:78, and 5:25 months for the selected years. The values for all years
are in gure (1).
value in 5:25 months. The values for all years from 1980 to 2013 obtained through
the simulations are in gure (1).
The e¤ect on the real interest rate implied by the model changes as the distribution
of cash-sales ratio changes from 1980 to 2013. The recent distribution of cash-sales
makes the real interest rate take longer to return to its initial value. The monetary
authority, therefore, is able to a¤ect the real interest for a longer period.
To check the robustness of our results, we simulate the economy with di¤erent
paths for the monetary policy shock and with di¤erent cash aggregates. We use other
identication methods of the shock, recalculate the parameters B and  of the process
for r (t), and obtain the e¤ect of the shock for the di¤erent estimates.
Besides using di¤erent identication methods for the monetary policy shock, we
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verify our results with di¤erent cash aggregates. Our results in gure (1) use cash
and equivalents (CHE) for the distribution of cash across rms, as CHE is the vari-
able usually used for rm cash holdings.14 It may be argued, however, that CHE
contains variables that are not in traditional monetary aggregates such as short-term
marketable security, which is part of CHE but not of M1.15 To check whether we
maintain our results with a more restricted variable for rm cash holdings, we repeat
the exercise using only the cash component of cash and equivalents (CH instead of
CHE).
We use three forms of identication of the monetary policy shock, provided by
Uhlig (2005). In the rst, used to obtain the results of gure (1), Uhlig generates
impulse-response functions, obtained from an OLS estimate of a VAR, that satises
sign restrictions for the monetary policy shock and the price level for six months
after the shock. Figure (7), reproduced from Fig 2 of Uhlig (2005), contains the
results of this identication exercise. The gure has ten random draws of the impulse
responses that satisfy the sign restrictions and the upper and lower bounds of ten
thousand random draws of impulse responses. We added the process r (t) used in our
simulations, with the parametersB and  chosen to approximate the impulse-response
function of the shock.
The second method of identication follows a conventional identication proce-
dure found, for example, in Christiano et al. (1999). This method uses a standard
Cholesky decomposition and there is no imposition of sign restrictions. The third
method, called pure-sign-restriction approach by Uhlig, also imposes sign restrictions
for the identication and uses Bayesian methods. The OLS estimate and the pure-
14Cash and equivalents is used, for example, by Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004), Bover
and Watson (2005), Bates, Kahle and Stultz (2009), Bacchetta, Benhima, and Poilly (2014), among
others.
15A substantial part of CHE, in any case, is comprised by cash, which, by the industrial denition,
represents any immediately negotiable medium of exchange or any instruments normally accepted
by banks for deposit and immediate credit to a customers account(Compustat). This denition
closely resembles the denition of M1.
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sign-restriction approach produce similar results, although the pure-sign-restriction
approach satises additional technical requirements. The conventional identication
implies a larger increase of the interest rate at the time of the shock and a more per-
sistent shock as compared with the OLS estimate. The pure-sign-restriction approach
implies a smaller shock at the time of the shock and a somewhat more persistent shock.
The shock identied with the OLS estimate is in between the pure-sign-restriction
approach and the conventional identication.16
With the three di¤erent identication methods for the monetary policy shock and
the two variables for cash holdings, we have a total of six di¤erent simulations. The
results of these simulations are in gure (9). For comparison, the results in gure (1)
are repeated in the rst plot of gure (9) for the case with CHE.
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Months to Return to the Initial Interest Rate - With Different Identification Methods of r(t) and Different Cash Aggregates
Fig. 9: Results of simulations using di¤erent estimates for r(t) from Uhlig (2005) and
di¤erent cash aggregates. OLS Estimate: VAR with sign restrictions obtained by OLS
and random draws of possible impulse-response functions. Conventional Identica-
tion: conventional VAR without sign restrictions. Pure-Sign-Restriction Approach:
VAR with sign restrictions obtained with Bayesian methods. CHE: simulations with
cash and equivalents. CH: simulations with the cash portion of cash and equivalents.
The results in gure (1) are repeated in the rst plot with CHE. For all cases, the
time to return to the initial value of the real interest rate increases substantially.
16For the OLS estimate, conventional identication, and pure-sign-restriction approach: B =
 0:150,  = 0:3008; B =  0:158,  = 0:4497; and B =  0:167,  = 0:3852.
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All simulations imply that the time that it takes for the real interest rate to return
to its initial value increases as we change the cross-sectional distribution of cash
holdings from 1980 to 2013. The pure-sign-restriction approach implies a smaller
monetary policy shock. As a result, the simulations yield smaller e¤ects on the real
interest rate. The time during which the real interest rate is above its initial value
increases from 1:7 month in 1980 to 4:6 months in 2013, using the CHE aggregate,
compared with an increase from 1:8 month to 5:3 months with the OLS estimate. The
increase in cash holdings would therefore imply an increase on the e¤ects of the real
interest rate of 2:9 months according with the pure-sign-restriction and 3:5 according
with the OLS estimate. On the other hand, the conventional identication method
for the monetary policy shock implies a larger shock and a more persistent interest
rate shock. The simulations then yield longer e¤ects on the real interest rate. They
also yield a larger di¤erence between the duration in 1980 and 2013. The real interest
rate takes 1:9 month in 1980 and 5:6 months in 2013 to return to its initial value.
The e¤ect of the increase in cash holdings is then 3:7 months with the conventional
identication.
Working with CH instead of CHE for the cash aggregate also implies the same con-
clusions on the more prolonged e¤ect of monetary policy using the cash distribution
of recent periods. CHE implies larger e¤ects of monetary policy, although the e¤ects
in percentage terms are larger with CH. The predictions about the large increase in
the time for the real interest rate to return to its initial value are valid for both CH
and CHE. The di¤erence of the time for the real interest rate to return to its initial
value is less than 1 month on average for the simulations made with CH or with
CHE.17
Our simulations have the objective of isolating the e¤ect of the changes in the level
17We also used di¤erent ways of treating the data, using di¤erent constraints on minimum cash
holdings, truncation values for the cash-sales ratio, and minimum sales. These modications do not
change conclusions in a signicant way.
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of cash holdings and in the cross-sectional distribution of cash holdings from 1980 to
2013. Our point is that the increase from 1:9 month in 1980 to 5:6 month in 2013
can be attributed, according to our simulations, to the changes the behavior toward
cash holdings over the period. The model used by us, with market segmentation and
a non-degenerate distribution of cash holdings, is particularly useful to obtain these
predictions.
This exercise with additional shocks and cash aggregates, summarized in gure (9),
show that our predictions are not sensitive to changes around the setup of our rst
results. We still nd that the changes in the distribution of cash holdings generates a
longer period during which the real interest rate is a¤ected by monetary policy. The
conclusion that the current distribution of rm cash holdings implies stronger e¤ects
of monetary policy shocks is maintained.
6. Conclusions
We show that the recent increase in cash holdings by rms has strong macroeco-
nomic consequences. We nd that it a¤ects the response of the real interest rate to
nominal interest rate shocks. The e¤ect of rm cash holdings on monetary policy
is substantial. According to our predictions, the changes in the distribution of cash
holdings from 1980 to 2013 imply that the real interest rates takes 3:4 months more
in 2013 than in 1980 to return to its initial value after a shock.
The current distribution of cash holdings implies that changes in monetary policy
have more prolonged e¤ects. There is a current debate about how central banks
should increase nominal interest rates back to normal values, when the e¤ects of
the nancial crisis and of the sovereign debt crisis are mitigated. An implication of
our results is that these changes in interest rates should be made gradually in small
steps. Given the high current values of the cash-sales distribution as compared to past
values, changes in nominal interest rates will imply stronger e¤ects in the economy.
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Appendix
Aggregate transactions
Proof. Let i (ni) and i (ni) denote the Lagrange multipliers on (5) andM
 
i (T1i (ni)) 
0. The rst order conditions imply P (t) c (t; ni) = e
 teR(Tji)
(ni)
for t 2 (Tji; Tj+1i),
P (Tji) c
+ (Tji; ni) =
e TjieR(Tji)
(ni)
for t = Tji, and P (Tj+1i) c  (Tj+1i; ni) = e
 Tj+1ieR(Tji)
(ni)
for t ! Tj+1i, t < Tj+1i, j = 1; 2; :::, i = 1; :::I. Similarly, P (t) c (t; ni) = e t(ni) for
t 2 (0; T1i), P (0) c+ (0; ni) = 1(ni) , and P (T1i) c  (T1i) = e
 T1i
(ni)
. The rst transfer oc-
curs at T1i = ni. ForM i (ni), Q (T1i) (ni)  (ni)  0, with equality ifM i (ni) > 0.
Therefore, the rst order conditions for transactions imply that nominal transactions
P (t) c (t; ni) decrease at the rate  within holding periods. Together with the con-
straints (2) and (4), the rst order conditions imply  (ni) = 1W0i(ni)+Q(T1i)M i (ni)
e n

and  (ni) = 1M0i(ni) M i (ni)
1 e ni

.
The values ofM0i (ni) andW0i (ni) such that the economy is in an equilibrium with
constant interest rate at t = 0 are such that (1) nominal transactions P (t) c (t; ni)
evolve at the steady state rate and (2) all rms start a holding period with trans-
actions c0i, excluding the shorter holding period from t = 0 to t = ni. By the
rst order conditions,  (t) + _c(t;ni)
c(t;ni)
=  . So, transactions decrease at the rate
 and, in the steady state, transactions decrease at the rate  +  = r. For an
arbitrary rm ni, nominal transactions at t = 0 are P0c (0; ni) = P0c0ie r(Ni ni),
where P0 is the price level at t = 0 in the steady state before the shock hits the
economy. The value c0ie r(Ni ni) implies that rm ni makes transactions c0i just af-
ter the rst bond trade. Therefore, from
R ni
0
P (t) c (t; ni) dt + M
 
i (ni) = M0i (ni),
imposing M i (ni) = 0, we obtain M0i (ni) = P0c0ie
 r(Ni ni) 1 e ni

. Analogously,
W0i (ni) =
P1
j=1Q (Tji)
R Tj+1i
Tji
P (t) c (t; ni) dt. We have Tji = ni + Ni (j   1), j = 1,
2, ::: As Q (Tji) = e rTji and transactions decrease at the rate  at the steady state,
then W0i (ni) = P0c0i e
 ni

. Using constraints (2) and (4) with K (ni) = 0 and the
rst order conditions, we obtain  (ni) = 1 e
 ni
M0(ni)
and  (ni) = e
 ni
W0i(ni)
. Substituting
M0i (ni) and W0i (ni) implies  (ni) = e
r(Ni ni)
P0c0i
and i (ni) = 1P0c0i . The condition to
verify whether M i (ni) = 0 is  (ni) > Q (T1) (ni), which holds as e
rNi > 1. With
W0i (ni), we obtain B0i (ni) by B0i (ni) = W0i (ni) 
R1
0
Q (t)P (t)Yidt.
To obtain aggregate transactions, suppose an arbitrary t  Ni (the argument is
similar for t < Ni). As t  Ni, we know that rm ni has already made the rst trans-
fer. As nominal transactions decrease at the rate r, we have c (t; ni) = c0ie r(t Tji(ni)),
for the highest j (ni) such that Tji (ni)  t < Tj+1i (ni). Firms with ni 2 [0; t  jNi)
are in their (j + 1)th holding period while rms with ni 2 [t   jN;Ni) are in their
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jth holding period. Aggregate transactions are then 1
Ni
R t jNi
0
c0ie
 r(t Tj+1i(ni))dni +
1
Ni
R Ni
t jN c0ie
 r(t Tji(ni))dni. Changing variables to s  Tj+1i = ni+jNi and si  Tji =
ni+(j 1)Ni in the rst and second integrals, we obtainCi (t) = 1Ni
R t
t Ni c0ie
 r(t si)dsi.
With another change of variables, Ci (t) = 1Ni
R Ni
0
c0ie
 rxdx, which implies Ci (t) =
c0i
1  e rNi
rNi
.
Cash-sales ratio
To obtain the cash-sales ratio, m = M(t)
P (t)Y
, rst note that aggregate cash holdings
grows at the same rate of ination in the steady state. Therefore, the cash-sales ratio
is constant in the steady state. In particular, m = M(0)
P0Y
. At time zero, aggregate
cash holdings are equal to M (0) =
1
Ni
R Ni
0
M0 (ni) dni. Substituting the values found
for M0 (ni) and dividing by P0Y , we obtain mi = e
 rNi

rNi
1 e rNi [
erNi 1
rNi
  e(r )Ni 1
(r )Ni ].
Finally, as M (0) and Y are normalized to 1, we obtain P0 = 1=m. With this nal
step, we obtain all equilibrium prices and quantities of the steady state.
Proposition 1. Proof. First note that all rms choose M i (ni) = 0 under the
new interest rate path r (t), given the initial cash and bond holdings M0i (ni) and
W0i (ni) of the rst steady state. As a result, in particular, the Lagrange multipliers
 (ni) and  (ni) do not change with the shock. To show this statement, we have to
show that the condition for M i (ni) = 0, given by  (ni) > Q (ni) (ni), holds for
every ni. We have  (ni) = e
 ni
[W0(ni)+Q(ni)M (ni)]
and  (ni) = 1 e
 ni
[M0(ni) M (ni)] with the
rst order conditions and the budget constraints. Substituting the values of M0i (ni)
and W0i (ni) for the initial equilibrium, we have that the condition for M i (ni) = 0
holds if and only if er(Ni ni) > Q (ni), which is always true as Q (ni) < 1 (moreover,
 (ni) = Q (ni) (ni) cannot hold for K (ni) > 0).
We obtain the price level at each time with the market clearing condition for trans-
actions. For t  Ni, all rms have already made their rst bond trade. Working simi-
larly as above, aggregate transactions are given by C (t) = P0c0i
Ni
R t jNi
0
e teR(Tj+1)
P (t)
dni+
P0c0i
Ni
R Ni
t jNi
e teR(Tj)
P (t)
dni, substituting  (ni) = 1P0c0i . Firms ni 2 [0; t jNi) are in their
(j + 1)th holding period and rms with ni 2 [t  jN;Ni) are in their jth holding pe-
riod. We have, therefore, C (t) = P0c0i
Ni
R t
t Ni
e teR(ni)
P (t)
dni. For 0  t < Ni, rms with
ni 2 [0; t) have already made their rst bond trade and rms with ni 2 [t; Ni) are in
the short holding period from zero to t = ni. Let real transactions of these two groups
be denoted by C1 (t) = P0c0i
Ni
R t
0
e teR(ni)
P (t)
dni and C0 (t) = 1Ni
R Ni
t
e t
(ni)P (t)
dni. Aggre-
gate real transactions are then C (t) = C1 (t) +C0 (t). As t! Ni, the group of rms
that has not made a transfer decreases, and so C0 (t) decreases to zero. Substituting
 (ni) =
er(Ni ni)
P0c0i
, we obtain C0 (t) = P0c0ie
 t(1 e r(Ni t))
P (t)rN
, where r is the nominal in-
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terest rate before the shock. With C (t) = Y , we obtain P (t) in the statement of the
proposition.
Proposition 2. Proof. Obtain P (0) = P0 by using the formula of P (t) for
t = 0. Also, limt!0 P (t) = P0, which shows that P (t) is continuous at t = 0, and so
does not jump at the time of the shock. The derivative of P (t) with respect to t is
_P (t) = k[ e t R t
0
eR(ni)dni + e
 teR(t)  e t+(r )e(r )te rN
r
], where k is a constant.
So, ination just after the shock remains equal to ination before the shock,  (0) =
r    =  for any r (t). As the real interest rate before the shock is v = , we have
v (0) v = r (0) r. We have z (t) = r (t)  (t)) z (t) = +r (t)  e
R(t)   eR(t Ni)R t
t Ni e
R(ni)dni
,
using the formula of P (t) for t  Ni. We obtain limNi!0 z (t) =  + r (t)   r (t) =
, which implies that the real interest rate is constant for any r (t) if there is no
market segmentation and, consequently, no heterogeneity in the distribution of cash
holdings.
1 0.8 0.00 11 3.9 0.00 21 7.7 0.35 31 15.4 1.71 41 33.8 0.00
2 1.1 0.00 12 4.2 0.00 22 8.2 6.66 32 16.5 7.16 42 37.0 2.27
3 1.5 0.00 13 4.5 11.91 23 8.9 0.00 33 17.8 2.80 43 41.0 1.30
4 1.9 0.00 14 4.8 0.00 24 9.5 0.00 34 19.1 1.73 44 45.4 3.95
5 2.2 0.00 15 5.2 0.00 25 10.2 0.00 35 20.6 1.37 45 52.3 0.00
6 2.5 0.00 16 5.5 0.00 26 10.8 7.89 36 22.2 2.17 46 59.2 4.08
7 2.8 0.00 17 5.9 6.59 27 11.7 0.08 37 24.0 0.00 47 69.6 3.25
8 3.1 0.00 18 6.2 4.24 28 12.6 1.03 38 25.7 8.17 48 85.6 1.31
9 3.4 0.00 19 6.7 1.68 29 13.5 3.09 39 27.8 4.60 49 116.9 1.08
10 3.6 0.00 20 7.2 0.06 30 14.5 0.00 40 30.1 8.99 50 202.4 0.48
1 0.6 0.16 11 11.5 0.00 21 31.4 0.74 31 62.1 2.84 41 138.1 1.83
2 1.2 0.02 12 12.7 16.45 22 34.2 0.00 32 66.4 1.32 42 153.0 0.74
3 1.9 1.23 13 14.7 0.00 23 37.3 0.00 33 71.0 2.06 43 168.7 3.28
4 2.8 0.00 14 16.5 1.66 24 39.6 1.05 34 76.3 0.00 44 188.9 1.31
5 3.8 0.00 15 18.4 0.21 25 42.1 3.84 35 81.6 11.34 45 212.3 5.03
6 4.6 2.99 16 20.7 0.00 26 45.0 0.00 36 88.0 4.73 46 245.8 2.17
7 5.7 1.24 17 22.6 6.30 27 47.7 0.68 37 95.8 0.97 47 292.0 1.31
8 6.8 2.20 18 24.8 0.00 28 50.4 7.49 38 104.4 0.31 48 363.4 2.18
9 8.5 0.00 19 27.0 0.00 29 54.0 2.13 39 113.2 3.96 49 507.4 2.45
10 10.0 0.00 20 29.1 3.52 30 58.2 0.00 40 125.7 0.00 50 974.7 0.26
1980
2010
௜ܰ ݒ௒೔ ௜ܰ ݒ௒೔ ௜ܰ ݒ௒೔ ௜ܰ ݒ௒೔௜ܰ ݒ௒೔
௜ܰ ݒ௒೔ ௜ܰ ݒ௒೔ ௜ܰ ݒ௒೔ ௜ܰ ݒ௒೔௜ܰ ݒ௒೔
Average ܰ ൌ 23.6 days.
Average ܰ ൌ 90.4 days.
Table 1: Values of vYi and Ni for each percentile i = 1; :::; 50 of mHi . vYi in % and
Ni in days. These values were used to generate the distributions of cash-sales for
1980 and 2010 in gure (6). The average N is a weighted average of Ni using vYi as
weights.
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